I’d say it’s more than boogeymen. Israel knows everyone in the region hates it and will always hate it, so they want their neighbors as weak and chaotic as possible so they can be exploited by themselves and America. Israel would never be able to do the shit they do if their neighbors were anything but cynical dictatorships and failed states.
I mean, everything up to and including military action. The EU would probably get off its ass and do something about that trade treaty faster if there were real consequences for failing to do so, and a democratic Egypt or Syria could blockade Israel’s Israel’s Mediterranean ports. A democratic Egypt would also never enforce its side of the blockade. And of course there’s always the possibility of war. So yeah, Israel’s apartheid and genocide rely on its neighbors being weak or non-democratic, preferably both.
I mean, everything up to and including military action.
Man, how did that work out the last four times it was tried, against a much weaker Israel and with a much stronger pan-Arab alliance?
And, for that matter, since when are democratic states eager to enter into expensive and bloody wars over issues of foreign affairs?
You’re looking at a hypermilitarized pariah state which views outside intervention as a threat to their continued existence. “We can pressure them, or, failing that, beat them in a war which we will dedicate ourselves to the hilt to!” is not a realistic analysis of the situation.
And a blockade is not only an act of war by international law, but would also certainly be viewed as one by Israel and responded to with extensive military force. How many ships and how many servicemen are a democratic Syria and Egypt willing to lose to get a worthless pinky-promise not to commit genocide (until Syria or Egypt’s back is turned) from Israel?
Israel’s desire for the surrounding states to remain ineffective and/or atrocious relates to their own internal politics more than a theoretical grand strategy of realpolitik that hasn’t been relevant since the decline of seriously intended pan-Arabist threats to ‘drive the Israelis into the sea’.
It is moral and correct to add to pressure on the Israelis. But it’s not a real solution in and of itself, no more than pressuring North Korea or Iran is a real solution.
Man, how did that work out the last four times it was tried, against a much weaker Israel and with a much stronger pan-Arab alliance?
I’d contest both these notions. In 1948 you had states who were recently or currently under colonization, with armies built along outdated Ottoman lines, against Jewish militias that had superior numbers, not bad at all arms (fucking thanks for that, Poland and Czechoslovakia), British training and infrastructure and WWII experience. 1956 was the Suez crisis, which… uh… yeah. 1967 had many of the same issues as 1948, only with better weapons on both sides. And finally in 1973 Egypt actually had some success after modernizing its army, but then Sadat reared his ugly head and turned the war from a clear Egyptian victory into an inconclusive engagement. And yes, it was inconclusive; Israel whipped Syria but they have no claim to victory on the Egyptian front. Also remember that American full-throttle support was already a thing by that point.
My point being: The Arab states were and are held back by inflexible dictatorships and their colonial legacies; neither Egypt not Syria are at anything resembling their full potential. I mean when you ask yourself why a country like Egypt isn’t a great power state on par with France or Britain, half the answer turns out to be colonialism, eye-wateringly bad dictatorial governance and corruption. This sounds like hyperbole but it’s really not. I should also note that the IDF hasn’t had a real engagement with a peer army in decades; I strongly doubt they’re prepared to fight anything more than militias in terms of military doctrine.
And, for that matter, since when are democratic states eager to enter into expensive and bloody wars over issues of foreign affairs?
You could probably find an example in Roman history, but I’d say since Revolutionary France entered a generation-long war purely out of hatred for Austrians. And on that bit, I think you underestimate the sheer amount of hatred Arabs of all shapes and stripes have for Israel and their apartheid. In Egypt Sadat is still viewed as a war hero for his role in the Yom Kippur war, despite a pretty mixed leaning towards bad legacy otherwise.
How many ships and how many servicemen are a democratic Syria and Egypt willing to lose to get a worthless pinky-promise not to commit genocide (until Syria or Egypt’s back is turned) from Israel?
I mean, you’d be looking at a full overhaul of the relationship between Palestine and Israel at that point, not a worthless pinky promise, but as for how many? Probably more than you’d expect. A weakened Israel would be good for its neighbors in all sorts of ways, so it’s not like you’re looking at purely ideological reasons, though that would still be the main motivator.
that hasn’t been relevant since the decline of seriously intended pan-Arabist threats to ‘drive the Israelis into the sea’.
It’s doesn’t seem relevant now because most Arab countries are dictatorships willing to cut deals an Arab Muslim electorate would never stomach. Success of a preventive measure doesn’t mean it’s irrelevant.
It is moral and correct to add to pressure on the Israelis. But it’s not a real solution in and of itself, no more than pressuring North Korea or Iran is a real solution.
In Iran’s case the pressure is almost all coming from the West, not from their immediate neighbors. The West’s geopolitical clout is obviously immense, but there’s still only so much you can do from half a world away. As for North Korea, its land border with China is really what’s saving it here. Again, no such thing exists for Israel. This makes it extremely vulnerable to coercion tactics. I mean you’ve seen how much damage Yemen did with drones and Iranian missiles; replicate that on its Mediterranean coasts and the choice will be give in or starve to death.
In 1948 you had states who were recently or currently under colonization, with armies built along outdated Ottoman lines,
This is very far from true. The Egyptian Army was intensely modernized in both technology and organization by WW2, while the Syrian Army was kept weaker (especially in the command element) by the French, it was still fundamentally a modern and French-style army, not Ottoman, by '48.
and WWII experience
… what WW2 experience? Most Jews in Mandatory Palestine arrived before the outbreak of WW2; only a few volunteers in the paramilitaries would have had WW2 experience at the outbreak of the war. While some of the long-term Zionist settlers would have been in the multiethnic Middle-East Commando, there would have been Palestinians with that same experience on the opposite side in '48. I find it difficult to attribute WW2 experience to the Israeli success in 1948.
And finally in 1973 Egypt actually had some success after modernizing its army, but then Sadat reared his ugly head and turned the war from a clear Egyptian victory into an inconclusive engagement. And yes, it was inconclusive; Israel whipped Syria but they have no claim to victory on the Egyptian front.
… the idea that the Yom Kippur War was an Egyptian victory beyond the initial surprise attack is extremely curious. What is it that Sadat did that you think turned it into an inconclusive engagement?
Also remember that American full-throttle support was already a thing by that point.
In 1973? Not even close to true.
I mean when you ask yourself why a country like Egypt isn’t a great power state on par with France or Britain, half the answer turns out to be colonialism, eye-wateringly bad dictatorial governance and corruption. This sounds like hyperbole but it’s really not.
I mean, I don’t disagree, but even if Egypt was operating at the same level of France, my conclusions would remain the same.
I should also note that the IDF hasn’t had a real engagement with a peer army in decades; I strongly doubt they’re prepared to fight anything more than militias in terms of military doctrine.
Short of having the armies of Syria and Egypt go through decades of reforms and rebuilding in a handful of months, how do you expect Egypt and Syria to spend years to create the necessary warfighting institutions that Israel simply fails to notice and react to?
but I’d say since Revolutionary France entered a generation-long war purely out of hatred for Austrians.
… Revolutionary France entered into a generation-long war out of the (correct) perception that the Austrians were seeking the total destruction of the French Republic. Not to mention that pre-industrial wars are a very different beast - and certainly pre-industrial wars wherein one party enjoys overwhelming success, which is far from guaranteed - and certainly pre-industrial wars in a polity that is not all that democratic to begin with, as the Directory, the Consulate, and the Empire were the prosecutors of the wars in the majority of that period.
And on that bit, I think you underestimate the sheer amount of hatred Arabs of all shapes and stripes have for Israel and their apartheid.
Hatred is one thing. The willingness to sacrifice your own sons and daughters is another - and the question arises, how many? Would a million be an acceptable price, like Russia has lost in Ukraine? Democracies are much more sensitive to such losses than strongman states; how much blood and how much of the nation’s future would a democratic Egypt be willing to sacrifice against nuclear-armed Israel in an attempt to bring them to the negotiating table? It’s taken as a matter of (correct) course that Poles fucking hate Russia, and with plenty of reason to do so - existential reasons, even - yet Poland has still declined to enter into the war in Ukraine. Democracies are not easy to goad into expensive and bloody wars.
America, which has three times the population of Egypt and is immensely wealthy, had record-breaking protests over the casualties inflicted in the Iraq War (and while I would love to say it was out of a sudden burst of principle, I have my fucking doubts) which resulted in the electoral thrashing of the responsible government. The numbers - some 4,500 American dead over the course of 5 years. About as many Americans were struck (though not killed) by lightning in that same period. How many Egyptian dead, do you think, will occur in a war with Israel?
And the cost - as Eisenhower once said, every missile is a child left hungry, every tank a theft of the nation’s future - what financial cost will the Egyptian people accept as a sacrifice in a war against Israel with uncertain chances of victory? The US burned through literal trillions of dollars in the ~8 years of the Iraq War, and that was against a foe which was largely suppressed after the initial month of the invasion. Right now, Americans - and other Western democracies - are increasingly balking at the much lower cost of simply supplying Ukraine, for those same simple reasons stated - will an Egyptian democracy be ‘pure’ of these petty concerns, willing to accept a war with Israel on high-minded terms at any cost?
I mean, you’d be looking at a full overhaul of the relationship between Palestine and Israel at that point, not a worthless pinky promise,
From a blockade? Hardly. I would doubt Israeli society would capitulate its genocidal aims based on military coercion for anything less than a successfully prosecuted war - and especially since blockades are a notoriously difficult thing to enforce even with air superiority and naval supremacy, as seen by the aerially-challenged and navally bereft Ukraine having rendered the attempted blockade of Russia to a financial inconvenience rather than the hoped-for crushing blow.
but as for how many? Probably more than you’d expect.
Enough to wrest Israel out of what it would view as an existential crisis for the existence of the state and probably with full support of Israeli society?
It’s doesn’t seem relevant now because most Arab countries are dictatorships willing to cut deals an Arab Muslim electorate would never stomach. Success of a preventive measure doesn’t mean it’s irrelevant.
My point is that the goals and motivations of current Israeli policy are very different from what they were previously. Their primary interest now is not in preventing an invasion that seems unlikely to come or develop in any form in the near-to-medium future, but in providing ‘red meat’ for the increasing right-wing leaning of already-quite-right-wing Israeli society.
In Iran’s case the pressure is almost all coming from the West, not from their immediate neighbors. The West’s geopolitical clout is obviously immense, but there’s still only so much you can do from half a world away.
There is an immense amount of pressure on Iran from Arab states, as led in coalition by the Saudis. It has yet to topple Iran or change Iranian domestic policy, or give any hint that it is assisting meaningfully in such measures.
As for North Korea, its land border with China is really what’s saving it here. Again, no such thing exists for Israel. This makes it extremely vulnerable to coercion tactics.
What do you think the land border with China is saving North Korea from, exactly?
I mean you’ve seen how much damage Yemen did with drones and Iranian missiles
… Israel is estimated to have lost 4 billion over the past two years of the attempted Houthi blockade, which itself has been reliant on blatant violations of international law to achieve its effects, resulting in military pressure from even parties uninvolved in defense of the Israeli genocide. That’s not chump change, but it’s also not exactly the kind of numbers which pressure a state to change a core policy, and has come at the cost of engagement with a number of additional belligerents. Is that a viable plan for Egypt, do you think?
replicate that on its Mediterranean coasts and the choice will be give in or starve to death.
Again, see above - even naval supremacy and air superiority - both very questionable achievements - are far from capable of enforcing a blockade against a modernized military.
This is very far from true. The Egyptian Army was intensely modernized in both technology and organization by WW2, while the Syrian Army was kept weaker (especially in the command element) by the French, it was still fundamentally a modern and French-style army, not Ottoman, by '48.
Okay fair enough, I was thinking of the excessively rigid military doctrine, not the structure of the armies themselves. I also can’t find anything about this dating back to the Ottomans, so I guess you can ignore that part.
So yeah. Zionists had some pretty impressive forces by 1948.
What is it that Sadat did that you think turned it into an inconclusive engagement?
First he forced an attack on Israeli positions not covered by the Egyptian SAM umbrella, which was the lynchpin of the war (Egypt had no illusions about its ability to face off with the Israeli Air Force), losing Egyptian troops and giving Israel the momentum to launch a counteroffensive. Second, when during that counteroffensive Israel crossed the Suez Canal, he prevented his chief of staff from moving forces to the West Bank of the Canal to stop them. This would later lead to the disabling of Egypt’s SAM umbrella and the complete derailing of the war effort. Egypt’s goal in the war, was to take the East Bank of the Suez (which was protected by the SAM umbrella) and hold onto it for dear life to get Sinai in a negotiated peace, so while Sadat’s meddling wasn’t outright fatal it greatly strengthened the Israeli position. Had Israel’s crossing been limited by prompt Egyptian intervention, the war would’ve been a clear Egyptian victory, which probably wouldn’t have mattered much in the long term but it would’ve prevented Zionists from acting so fucking smug about the whole thing.
how do you expect Egypt and Syria to spend years to create the necessary warfighting institutions that Israel simply fails to notice and react to?
I mean, Syria does need to rebuild but Egypt already has those institutions; it just needs competent leadership able to fund and use them. If anything it’s the Egyptian economy that needs drastic reform. While some new military ideas likely do need to be imported, the one thing the Egyptian regime has done is keep the military well-armed and trained. Edit: I’d also expect Israeli hubris to come in clutch here, but that’s not exactly guaranteed.
Revolutionary France entered into a generation-long war out of the (correct) perception that the Austrians were seeking the total destruction of the French Republic.
Uh… no? The War of the First Coalition predates the Republic, and if anything the Holy Roman Emperor was supportive of the French Revolutionary project and was (very clumsily) trying to avoid war with the increasingly war-hungry French. It was French warmongers pushing for war with Austrians to weed out supposed foreign agents and conspirators and bring Revolutionary Purity™ to the country. The stuff about Austria wanting to destroy the Revolution was only true in the French’s heads, at least at the start.
Hatred is one thing. The willingness to sacrifice your own sons and daughters is another - and the question arises, how many?
I mean, I have no idea, but do note that a whole generation of Arabs has been radicalized against Israel by the genocide in Gaza, so it wouldn’t be too hard to push a Holy War of Patriotic Liberation on Behalf of our Palestinian Brothers™ (I’m only slightly exaggerating). Even in purely cynical terms, this sounds like a great way to distract from domestic issues. The question becomes whether the hypothetical government can get going and maintain enough of a war fever, which isn’t guaranteed but I wouldn’t bet against it either.
Democracies are not easy to goad into expensive and bloody wars.
It’s not easy, but it does happen. See: WWII.
Their primary interest now is not in preventing an invasion that seems unlikely to come or develop in any form in the near-to-medium future, but in providing ‘red meat’ for the increasing right-wing leaning of already-quite-right-wing Israeli society
If they gave them 5 minuits to set up a functioning democracy. There is a slim chance something can be pulled from the Assad regime.
Israel can’t allow that, they need all the boogeymen they can get to sustain their domestic right-wing political machine.
I’d say it’s more than boogeymen. Israel knows everyone in the region hates it and will always hate it, so they want their neighbors as weak and chaotic as possible so they can be exploited by themselves and America. Israel would never be able to do the shit they do if their neighbors were anything but cynical dictatorships and failed states.
How would their neighbors stop Israel’s genocidal behavior if they were functioning non-cynical non-dictatorships?
I mean, everything up to and including military action. The EU would probably get off its ass and do something about that trade treaty faster if there were real consequences for failing to do so, and a democratic Egypt or Syria could blockade Israel’s Israel’s Mediterranean ports. A democratic Egypt would also never enforce its side of the blockade. And of course there’s always the possibility of war. So yeah, Israel’s apartheid and genocide rely on its neighbors being weak or non-democratic, preferably both.
Man, how did that work out the last four times it was tried, against a much weaker Israel and with a much stronger pan-Arab alliance?
And, for that matter, since when are democratic states eager to enter into expensive and bloody wars over issues of foreign affairs?
You’re looking at a hypermilitarized pariah state which views outside intervention as a threat to their continued existence. “We can pressure them, or, failing that, beat them in a war which we will dedicate ourselves to the hilt to!” is not a realistic analysis of the situation.
And a blockade is not only an act of war by international law, but would also certainly be viewed as one by Israel and responded to with extensive military force. How many ships and how many servicemen are a democratic Syria and Egypt willing to lose to get a worthless pinky-promise not to commit genocide (until Syria or Egypt’s back is turned) from Israel?
Israel’s desire for the surrounding states to remain ineffective and/or atrocious relates to their own internal politics more than a theoretical grand strategy of realpolitik that hasn’t been relevant since the decline of seriously intended pan-Arabist threats to ‘drive the Israelis into the sea’.
It is moral and correct to add to pressure on the Israelis. But it’s not a real solution in and of itself, no more than pressuring North Korea or Iran is a real solution.
I’d contest both these notions. In 1948 you had states who were recently or currently under colonization, with armies built along outdated Ottoman lines, against Jewish militias that had superior numbers, not bad at all arms (fucking thanks for that, Poland and Czechoslovakia), British training and infrastructure and WWII experience. 1956 was the Suez crisis, which… uh… yeah. 1967 had many of the same issues as 1948, only with better weapons on both sides. And finally in 1973 Egypt actually had some success after modernizing its army, but then Sadat reared his ugly head and turned the war from a clear Egyptian victory into an inconclusive engagement. And yes, it was inconclusive; Israel whipped Syria but they have no claim to victory on the Egyptian front. Also remember that American full-throttle support was already a thing by that point.
My point being: The Arab states were and are held back by inflexible dictatorships and their colonial legacies; neither Egypt not Syria are at anything resembling their full potential. I mean when you ask yourself why a country like Egypt isn’t a great power state on par with France or Britain, half the answer turns out to be colonialism, eye-wateringly bad dictatorial governance and corruption. This sounds like hyperbole but it’s really not. I should also note that the IDF hasn’t had a real engagement with a peer army in decades; I strongly doubt they’re prepared to fight anything more than militias in terms of military doctrine.
You could probably find an example in Roman history, but I’d say since Revolutionary France entered a generation-long war purely out of hatred for Austrians. And on that bit, I think you underestimate the sheer amount of hatred Arabs of all shapes and stripes have for Israel and their apartheid. In Egypt Sadat is still viewed as a war hero for his role in the Yom Kippur war, despite a pretty mixed leaning towards bad legacy otherwise.
I mean, you’d be looking at a full overhaul of the relationship between Palestine and Israel at that point, not a worthless pinky promise, but as for how many? Probably more than you’d expect. A weakened Israel would be good for its neighbors in all sorts of ways, so it’s not like you’re looking at purely ideological reasons, though that would still be the main motivator.
It’s doesn’t seem relevant now because most Arab countries are dictatorships willing to cut deals an Arab Muslim electorate would never stomach. Success of a preventive measure doesn’t mean it’s irrelevant.
In Iran’s case the pressure is almost all coming from the West, not from their immediate neighbors. The West’s geopolitical clout is obviously immense, but there’s still only so much you can do from half a world away. As for North Korea, its land border with China is really what’s saving it here. Again, no such thing exists for Israel. This makes it extremely vulnerable to coercion tactics. I mean you’ve seen how much damage Yemen did with drones and Iranian missiles; replicate that on its Mediterranean coasts and the choice will be give in or starve to death.
This is very far from true. The Egyptian Army was intensely modernized in both technology and organization by WW2, while the Syrian Army was kept weaker (especially in the command element) by the French, it was still fundamentally a modern and French-style army, not Ottoman, by '48.
… what WW2 experience? Most Jews in Mandatory Palestine arrived before the outbreak of WW2; only a few volunteers in the paramilitaries would have had WW2 experience at the outbreak of the war. While some of the long-term Zionist settlers would have been in the multiethnic Middle-East Commando, there would have been Palestinians with that same experience on the opposite side in '48. I find it difficult to attribute WW2 experience to the Israeli success in 1948.
… the idea that the Yom Kippur War was an Egyptian victory beyond the initial surprise attack is extremely curious. What is it that Sadat did that you think turned it into an inconclusive engagement?
In 1973? Not even close to true.
I mean, I don’t disagree, but even if Egypt was operating at the same level of France, my conclusions would remain the same.
Short of having the armies of Syria and Egypt go through decades of reforms and rebuilding in a handful of months, how do you expect Egypt and Syria to spend years to create the necessary warfighting institutions that Israel simply fails to notice and react to?
… Revolutionary France entered into a generation-long war out of the (correct) perception that the Austrians were seeking the total destruction of the French Republic. Not to mention that pre-industrial wars are a very different beast - and certainly pre-industrial wars wherein one party enjoys overwhelming success, which is far from guaranteed - and certainly pre-industrial wars in a polity that is not all that democratic to begin with, as the Directory, the Consulate, and the Empire were the prosecutors of the wars in the majority of that period.
Hatred is one thing. The willingness to sacrifice your own sons and daughters is another - and the question arises, how many? Would a million be an acceptable price, like Russia has lost in Ukraine? Democracies are much more sensitive to such losses than strongman states; how much blood and how much of the nation’s future would a democratic Egypt be willing to sacrifice against nuclear-armed Israel in an attempt to bring them to the negotiating table? It’s taken as a matter of (correct) course that Poles fucking hate Russia, and with plenty of reason to do so - existential reasons, even - yet Poland has still declined to enter into the war in Ukraine. Democracies are not easy to goad into expensive and bloody wars.
America, which has three times the population of Egypt and is immensely wealthy, had record-breaking protests over the casualties inflicted in the Iraq War (and while I would love to say it was out of a sudden burst of principle, I have my fucking doubts) which resulted in the electoral thrashing of the responsible government. The numbers - some 4,500 American dead over the course of 5 years. About as many Americans were struck (though not killed) by lightning in that same period. How many Egyptian dead, do you think, will occur in a war with Israel?
And the cost - as Eisenhower once said, every missile is a child left hungry, every tank a theft of the nation’s future - what financial cost will the Egyptian people accept as a sacrifice in a war against Israel with uncertain chances of victory? The US burned through literal trillions of dollars in the ~8 years of the Iraq War, and that was against a foe which was largely suppressed after the initial month of the invasion. Right now, Americans - and other Western democracies - are increasingly balking at the much lower cost of simply supplying Ukraine, for those same simple reasons stated - will an Egyptian democracy be ‘pure’ of these petty concerns, willing to accept a war with Israel on high-minded terms at any cost?
From a blockade? Hardly. I would doubt Israeli society would capitulate its genocidal aims based on military coercion for anything less than a successfully prosecuted war - and especially since blockades are a notoriously difficult thing to enforce even with air superiority and naval supremacy, as seen by the aerially-challenged and navally bereft Ukraine having rendered the attempted blockade of Russia to a financial inconvenience rather than the hoped-for crushing blow.
Enough to wrest Israel out of what it would view as an existential crisis for the existence of the state and probably with full support of Israeli society?
My point is that the goals and motivations of current Israeli policy are very different from what they were previously. Their primary interest now is not in preventing an invasion that seems unlikely to come or develop in any form in the near-to-medium future, but in providing ‘red meat’ for the increasing right-wing leaning of already-quite-right-wing Israeli society.
There is an immense amount of pressure on Iran from Arab states, as led in coalition by the Saudis. It has yet to topple Iran or change Iranian domestic policy, or give any hint that it is assisting meaningfully in such measures.
What do you think the land border with China is saving North Korea from, exactly?
… Israel is estimated to have lost 4 billion over the past two years of the attempted Houthi blockade, which itself has been reliant on blatant violations of international law to achieve its effects, resulting in military pressure from even parties uninvolved in defense of the Israeli genocide. That’s not chump change, but it’s also not exactly the kind of numbers which pressure a state to change a core policy, and has come at the cost of engagement with a number of additional belligerents. Is that a viable plan for Egypt, do you think?
Again, see above - even naval supremacy and air superiority - both very questionable achievements - are far from capable of enforcing a blockade against a modernized military.
Okay fair enough, I was thinking of the excessively rigid military doctrine, not the structure of the armies themselves. I also can’t find anything about this dating back to the Ottomans, so I guess you can ignore that part.
This WWII experience. Also,
So yeah. Zionists had some pretty impressive forces by 1948.
First he forced an attack on Israeli positions not covered by the Egyptian SAM umbrella, which was the lynchpin of the war (Egypt had no illusions about its ability to face off with the Israeli Air Force), losing Egyptian troops and giving Israel the momentum to launch a counteroffensive. Second, when during that counteroffensive Israel crossed the Suez Canal, he prevented his chief of staff from moving forces to the West Bank of the Canal to stop them. This would later lead to the disabling of Egypt’s SAM umbrella and the complete derailing of the war effort. Egypt’s goal in the war, was to take the East Bank of the Suez (which was protected by the SAM umbrella) and hold onto it for dear life to get Sinai in a negotiated peace, so while Sadat’s meddling wasn’t outright fatal it greatly strengthened the Israeli position. Had Israel’s crossing been limited by prompt Egyptian intervention, the war would’ve been a clear Egyptian victory, which probably wouldn’t have mattered much in the long term but it would’ve prevented Zionists from acting so fucking smug about the whole thing.
I mean, Syria does need to rebuild but Egypt already has those institutions; it just needs competent leadership able to fund and use them. If anything it’s the Egyptian economy that needs drastic reform. While some new military ideas likely do need to be imported, the one thing the Egyptian regime has done is keep the military well-armed and trained. Edit: I’d also expect Israeli hubris to come in clutch here, but that’s not exactly guaranteed.
Uh… no? The War of the First Coalition predates the Republic, and if anything the Holy Roman Emperor was supportive of the French Revolutionary project and was (very clumsily) trying to avoid war with the increasingly war-hungry French. It was French warmongers pushing for war with Austrians to weed out supposed foreign agents and conspirators and bring Revolutionary Purity™ to the country. The stuff about Austria wanting to destroy the Revolution was only true in the French’s heads, at least at the start.
I mean, I have no idea, but do note that a whole generation of Arabs has been radicalized against Israel by the genocide in Gaza, so it wouldn’t be too hard to push a Holy War of Patriotic Liberation on Behalf of our Palestinian Brothers™ (I’m only slightly exaggerating). Even in purely cynical terms, this sounds like a great way to distract from domestic issues. The question becomes whether the hypothetical government can get going and maintain enough of a war fever, which isn’t guaranteed but I wouldn’t bet against it either.
It’s not easy, but it does happen. See: WWII.
Fair enough.
Continued below.